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—  Note  — 
Preventing Conflict or 
Descending an Iron Curtain? 
Buffer-Zone Laws and Balancing 
Histories of Disruption  
with Free Speech 
“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron 
curtain has descended across the Continent. . . . I repulse the idea 
that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is 
because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and 
that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to 
speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do 
so.”1 
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1. Winston Churchill, Sinews of Peace (Mar. 5, 1946) (emphasis added). 
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Introduction 
Not unlike military buffer zones, free-speech buffer zones “create an 
area of separation”2 to alleviate tension between conflicting rights. 
Many argue that buffer zones act as a sort of “Iron Curtain”3 through 
which government interests wrongfully prevail over a constitutional 
command that is “the matrix, the indispensable condition” of United 
States democracy.4 But because the Constitution also reflects the princi-
ples of privacy, human dignity, and public order, others argue that 
something has got to give.5 
The Supreme Court had occasion to elaborate on this breaking 
point in McCullen v. Coakley.6 For decades, Massachusetts has been a 
“battleground state”7 in which antiabortion protestors have wielded 
obstruction, harassment, intimidation, and sometimes even violence to 
purposefully prevent women from obtaining access to medical care.8 
Massachusetts’ battle began in the early 1980s when Problem Pregnan-
cy, Inc., an antiabortion group, moved into the same building as Plan-
ned Parenthood, adopted the same logo, and attempted to lure clinic 
patients into their office.9 Later that same decade, the fight picked up 
 
2. Buffer Zone, MilitaryFactory.com, http://www.militaryfactory.com/ 
dictionary/military-terms-defined.asp?term_id=802 [http://perma.cc/3NSS- 
QU6F] (last updated July 17, 2015). 
3. Charles Lugosi, The Law of the Sacred Cow: Sacrificing the First Amendment 
to Defend Abortion on Demand, 79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 91, 93 (2001) (“A new 
form of Iron Curtain called a ‘bubble zone,’ has invaded the traditional public 
forum of city sidewalks . . . .”). 
4.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
5. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Georgetown University 
Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ 
supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html [http://perma.cc/D9L2- 
SERZ] (“For the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity of man  
. . . a sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity of every 
individual.”). 
6. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
7. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 172 (1st Cir. 2009). 
8. Joint App. at 84–89, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12–
1168) (referencing oral testimony of Gail Kaplan, Michael Baniukiewicz, and 
Liz McMahon). 
9. Patricia Baird-Windle & Eleanor J. Bader, Targets of Hatred 67 (2001) 
(explaining that Problem Pregnancy, Inc. would often scare clinic patients by 
surprising them with pictures of dismembered fetuses). 
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pace when “Operation Rescue”10 first targeted Massachusetts clinics.11 
Its members threatened, intimidated, and coerced clinic patients and 
employees.12 They obstructed access to clinics by standing or lying in 
front of entrances and often chained themselves to doors, one another, 
or, in at least one case, a toilet.13 They even set up decoys to trick the 
police and clinic workers.14 As a result, women frequently sacrificed 
medical treatment,15 police were often overburdened,16 and courts con-
stantly imposed and enforced injunctions to prevent such disruption.17 
One incident, in particular, grabbed the nation’s attention.18 On Decem-
ber 30, 1994, a gunman “dressed in black” calmly walked into two abor-
tion clinics in Greater Boston, asked each of the receptionists whether 
he was in the right place, pulled a rifle out of a duffel bag, and sprayed 
the clinics with gunfire, leaving two dead and five wounded.19 
The problems confronting Massachusetts were part of a greater 
“history of violence around abortion clinics” nationwide.20 To respond 
 
10. This national organization holds “a deep commitment” to causing targeted 
clinics to “cease operations entirely.” Nat’l Org. for Women v. Operation 
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
11. Sara Rimer, Brookline Shows Fervor in Keeping Clinics Open, N.Y. 
Times (Jan. 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/us/brookline- 
shows-fervor-in-keeping-clinics-open.html [http://perma.cc/PRL7-NSBJ]. 
12. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985, 989 
(Mass. 1994). 
13. Id. at 988; Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 
550 N.E.2d 1361, 1363 (Mass. 1990). 
14. See, e.g., Blake, 631 N.E.2d at 988 (explaining that protestors acted like 
clinic patients in order to gain access to the clinic and allow fellow protestors 
to “rush[]” in and lock the doors); Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d at 1364 
(“Sending about 75 rescuers as a decoy to [one clinic] . . . [the protesters] 
were able to draw the police away from the entrance to [another clinic].”). 
15. Blake, 631 N.E.2d at 990. 
16. Rimer, supra note 11. Though their precincts had as few as twelve jail cells, 
officers often arrested more than 200 protestors in a day. Id. 
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Filos, 649 N.E.2d 1085, 1086–87 n.1 (Mass. 
1995) (holding a protestor in criminal contempt for violating an injunction). 
18. See Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion 
Clinics, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/salvi.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
Q4ZV-LK4A] (stating that former President Bill Clinton, along with other 
politicians, denounced the acts as “domestic terrorism”). 
19. Id. 
20. Megan Amundson, Statement on the Anniversary of the Boston and Brookline 
Abortion Clinic Shootings in Light of McCullen v. Coakley, NARAL Pro-
Choice Mass. (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.prochoicemass.org/media/press/ 
20131226.shtml [http://perma.cc/E8LG-DXCE]; see also Jennifer Latson, 
How an Abortion-Clinic Shooting Led to a ‘Wrongful Life’ Lawsuit, Time 
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to this problem, the Massachusetts legislature implemented and revised 
buffer zones around its reproductive health care facilities.21 In Novem-
ber of 2007, the legislature determined that the Massachusetts Repro-
ductive Health Care Facilities Act22 struck the proper balance between 
ensuring public safety and protecting free speech.23 The Act’s buffer 
zone prohibited any person from “knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] 
on a public way or sidewalk” within a thirty-five-foot semicircle around 
entrances, exits, and driveways at reproductive health care facilities.24 
The legislature determined that this more stringent buffer zone was 
“necessary to address” the continuing disruption.25 But this buffer was 
“truly exceptional,” in that it was the only statutorily imposed fixed 
buffer zone around abortion clinics.26 
Led by a five-foot tall, seventy-seven-year-old grandmother, a group 
of “sidewalk counselors” brought the fight to federal court.27 Both the 
district court and the First Circuit held that the Act was not an un-
constitutional infringement on free speech.28 Regarding the history of 
 
(Dec. 30, 2014), http://time.com/3648437/john-salvi-shootings/ [http:// 
perma.cc/C6PF-5ZWU] (noting that “antiabortion violence had become 
disconcertingly common” by 1994). 
21. Originally, the legislature proposed a twenty-five-foot buffer zone. S. 148, 
181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess., § 2(b)(1). See also In re Op. of the Justices to the 
Senate, 723 N.E.2d 1, 2, 6 (Mass. 2000) (approving the bill’s constitutionality). 
Before the bill’s enactment, the legislature replaced the twenty-five-foot 
fixed buffer zone with a six-foot floating buffer zone within an eighteen-foot 
fixed buffer zone. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E 1/2(b) (2000); see also 
McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding the law’s 
constitutionality). 
22. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E1/2 (2008). 
23. Joint App., supra note 8, at 75–76 (referencing oral testimony of Represent-
ative Michael Festa). 
24. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E1/2(b) (2008). The statute exempted four 
classes of individuals from its blanket prohibition, including clinic employees 
“acting within the scope of their employment.” Id. 
25. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 (D. Mass. 2008). 
26. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2014). 
27. Adam Liptak, Where Free Speech Collides with Abortion Rights, N.Y. 
Times (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/us/where-
free-speech-collides-with-abortion-rights.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z22Q- 
ADJ9]. Sidewalk counselors distinguish themselves from protestors because 
they are guided by sympathy for women seeking abortion and use calm, 
personal conversation. Id. 
28. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 184 (1st Cir. 2009); McCullen v. Coakley, 
573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 425 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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disruption29 that prefaced the Act, the courts explained that Massachu-
setts “faced significant public safety problems” and that “a 35-foot fixed 
buffer zone was immediately necessary to protect public safety and 
ensure patient access to clinics.”30 The Supreme Court, however, unani-
mously reversed.31 Applying intermediate scrutiny,32 the Court held that 
the Act was not narrowly tailored,33 emphasized the serious burden on 
the sidewalk counselor’s speech,34 and admonished the breadth of the 
buffer zone.35 This conclusion was neither unsound nor surprising.36 
What is unsettling, however, is the Court’s analysis of the history 
of disruption that faced Massachusetts abortion clinics. The Court stat-
ed that “far from being ‘widespread,’ the problem appears from the 
record to be limited principally to the Boston clinic on Saturday morn-
ings”; that the record supports Massachusetts’ interest for only “one 
place at one time”; and that the broad statute failed to “focus[] on the 
precise individuals and the precise conduct causing a particular prob-
lem.”37 In doing so, the Court suggested that only history specific to the 
conduct, places, and persons restricted can inform legislative action. To 
state the inverse, broader problems that confront the nation as a whole 
cannot warrant restrictions on speech. This Note argues that the Cou-
rt’s subtle suggestion that a broader history of disruption cannot justify 
buffer zones contradicts precedent, departs from the concept of necess-
ity, and misleads courts and legislators. 
 
29. I use “history” to refer only to legislative facts—facts that “can be accurately 
and readily determined” by the legislature, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), and those 
that are “most needed in thinking about difficult problems of law and policy.” 
Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and 
Convenience, in Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman 
Scott 69, 82 (Roscoe Pound, Erwin N. Griswold & Arthur E. Sutherland 
eds., 1964). 
30. McCullen, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 410. 
31. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2518. 
32. Id. at 2530. The Court held that the law was content neutral, id. at 2531–
34, over Justice Scalia’s “scathing concurrence . . . that read[s] more like 
a dissent.” Michael Scott Leonard, Supreme Court Invalidates Massachusetts 
Abortion Clinic ‘Buffer Zone’ McCullen v. Coakley, 10 No. 4 Westlaw J. 
Med. Malpractice 1 (2014). 
33. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539. 
34. Id. at 2536 (“It is easier to ignore a strained voice or a waving hand than 
a direct greeting or an outstretched arm.”). 
35. Id. at 2537. 
36. See Alexandra Cabonor, McCullen v. Coakley: History in the Making, Jurist 
(Feb. 16, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2014/02/catherine-
short-abortion-clinic-buffer-zones.php [http://perma.cc/WSJ5-8SG9]. 
37. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2538–39. 
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Part I poses a question that is not at all uncommon: precisely when 
can legislators restrict free speech in order to protect public safety and 
order? It explains that lawmakers and courts struggle to balance two 
values, each of which is cherished by the United States legal system. 
On the one hand, freedom of speech is “indispensable” to United States 
democracy.38 On the other, it is the government’s duty to provide safe-
ty, order, and security to its citizenry. Part II discusses the mechanism 
through which courts measure whether a law strikes the appropriate 
balance between these two competing values. That balancing instru-
ment, heightened scrutiny,39 asks whether the law has a sufficient 
means-end fit to the government’s goal. It considers the legitimacy of 
the government’s interest, the amount of speech burdened by the law, 
and how necessary the law is. At its best, heightened scrutiny prevents 
lawmakers from lowering an iron curtain that stifles the free flow of 
ideas while also giving them sufficient leeway to deal with the problems 
that confront them. This Note focuses exclusively on necessity because 
it allows courts to consider the history of disruption motivating a given 
buffer-zone law. 
Part III defines “buffer zone,” analyzes First Amendment challenges 
to buffer zones, and points out that results in buffer-zone cases often 
turn on a law’s necessity. It argues that courts look to two factors when 
asking whether a given law is necessary: (1) the extent of the law’s 
history of disruption; and (2) the degree to which the disruption im-
pedes upon the government’s interest. Although the Court has recently 
framed this issue as one of specificity, neither its cases nor the concept 
of necessity compels the notion that lawmakers cannot impose buffer 
zones as a way of combatting broader problems. 
Part IV argues that the Court has unwittingly narrowed its inquiry. 
Precedent demonstrates that the Court often considers broader prob-
lems confronted by legislatures. Further, heightened scrutiny requires 
courts to consider all relevant factors to determine whether a law strikes 
the appropriate balance. By failing to factor in histories that confront 
other legislatures, the Court frustrates the goal of heightened scrutiny 
and its necessity element. 
Echoing the factors discussed in Part III, Part V proposes that 
courts and lawmakers look to two factors to help determine whether a 
given law is necessary. First, they should evaluate the extent of the 
law’s history of disruption. To do this, they should ask whether the 
history is pervasive, whether it is egregious, whether it calls for immed-
iate action, and whether it is particular. Second, courts and lawmakers 
should examine the degree to which the disruption impedes upon the 
government’s interest. If logic dictates that the government cannot ad-
vance its interest so long as the prohibited conduct persists, then the 
 
38.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
39. I use “heightened scrutiny” to refer to both strict and intermediate scrutiny. 
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government does not need to show that its interests have historically 
been harmed. 
I. The Clash Between Public Necessity  
and Free Speech 
The clash between the value of free speech and importance of main-
taining order—“a problem [that is] ‘as persistent as it is perplexing’”—
has long troubled the United States legal system.40 On the one hand, 
the First Amendment provides that the government “shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”41 Free speech is fundament-
al42 not only to individual liberty but also to the preservation and flour-
ishing of United States democracy.43 Without it, the individual’s “no-
tion of self-respect” dwindles,44 and society cannot evolve toward a 
“livelier impression of truth.”45 Even “offensive or disagreeable”46 speech 
holds an important place in public discourse because people can and 
should simply “avert[] their eyes”47 and because disagreeable speech oft-
en brings the most truth to light. This important constitutional prin-
ciple remains the same, regardless of the dangers that confront it.48 So 
the government must be acutely aware of the harm it can do to this 
principle when it acts under the guise of public need.49 
 
40. William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: 
The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 757, 757 (1986) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U.S. 268, 275 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
41. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
42. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
43. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State 
was to make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They valued liberty both 
as an end and as a means. . . . They believed that freedom to think as you 
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth . . . .”). 
44. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral 
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 62 (1974). 
45. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 20 (1863). 
46. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
47. Cohen v. California, 430 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
48. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of 
the right to free speech is always the same.”). 
49. See Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First 
Amendment Law, Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 395, 398–99 (2005) (explaining that the Supreme Court is very hostile 
toward content-based restrictions of speech). 
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Yet, the First Amendment’s command is not absolute.50 Not all pro-
tected speech is “equally permissible in all places and at all times.”51 At 
the heart of the free-speech guarantee lies the power of reason, which 
“gain[s] access to the mind” through “peaceful means.”52 “[U]tterance 
in a context of violence,” then, “can lose its significance” and its consti-
tutional protection.53 Moreover, the Court has stated that “the charac-
ter of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done,”54 
that people often have the “right to be let alone,”55 and that unwilling 
listeners need not “undertake Herculean efforts” to avoid protest.56 For 
these reasons, the government has “both the right and duty” to protect 
the public and to preserve other individual rights.57 Lawmakers and 
judges must balance the unchanging, fundamental right to “uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open” public debate58 against governmental inter-
ests to decide whether a law actually violates the First Amendment.59 
Part II explains that heightened scrutiny is the mechanism through 
which the Court balances these interests in an attempt to best resolve 
this “perplexing”60 clash. Part III argues that legislatures and courts 
often use buffer zones to strike this balance. This Note further argues, 
 
50. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). The government may regulate 
certain categories of unprotected or less protected speech based on their 
content. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). But 
see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) 
(“[The First Amendment] provides, in simple words, that ‘Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ I read 
‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”). 
51. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985)). 
52. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941). 
53. Id. 
54. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
55. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
56. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994). 
57. Jessica Wainwright, Note, The Evolutionary War on First Amendment 
Rights and Abortion Clinic Demonstration, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 231, 236 
(2001); see also Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 299 (explaining that the 
Court must give due recognition of the powers belonging to the states and 
that states have “the power to deal with coercion due to extensive violence”). 
58. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
59. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000) (explaining that when compar-
ing the rights of speakers to the rights of listeners “it is appropriate to examine 
the competing interests at stake”). 
60. Lee, supra note 40, at 757 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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along with Parts IV and V, that histories of disruption are an indispen-
sable part of this balancing process. 
II. Heightened Scrutiny: Striking the Balance 
Though its exact origins are somewhat unclear,61 the Court created 
heightened scrutiny to “selectively shift[]”62 the burden of proof to the 
government when it enacted “undesirable legislation” restricting funda-
mental rights.63 Before heightened scrutiny existed, almost all legislative 
and executive decisions received a “strong presumption of constitution-
ality” and “extreme deference.”64 This rationality review imposed an 
“insurmountable burden” on the party challenging the decision because 
“the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment [was] to be 
presumed.”65 While this approach was consistent with constitutional 
 
61. Heightened scrutiny appears nowhere in the Constitution, nowhere in the 
writings of our founding fathers, and nowhere in precedent prior to the mid-
20th century. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1267, 1268, 1284 (2007). Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The necessity test which developed 
to protect free speech against state infringement should be equally applicable 
in a case involving state racial discrimination—prohibition of which lies at 
the very heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.”), with Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that heightened scrutiny “derives 
from [the Court’s] equal protection jurisprudence”). 
62. Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse 47 
(1992). 
63. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
64. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 783, 786, 788 
(2007). See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: 
Illusion and Reality 78 (2001). 
65. Shaman, supra note 64, at 79; Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. See also 
O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 258 (1931) 
(“It does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts . . . that 
in New Jersey evils did not exist . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
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republicanism and the separation of powers,66 it was tone deaf to nu-
anced constitutional rights, including the right to free speech.67 
Thus, the Court began calling for a “more searching judicial in-
quiry”68 in order to “flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions 
infected with them” and to prevent the government from “distorting” 
the content and quality of public dialogue.69 Because the government 
cannot “select which issues are worth discussing or debating,”70 content- 
or viewpoint-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.71 If the govern-
ment “adopt[s] a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
 
66. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“If it were a question whether I agreed with that [economic] theory, I should 
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not 
conceive that to be my duty . . . .”); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 131, 
133 (1893) (explaining that the judicial power to strike down legislative action 
authorized by the Constitution is “by no means a necessary one” and was 
long considered “anti-Republican”). 
67. G. Edward White, History and the Constitution: Collected 
Essays 150–76 (2007); Gaskins, supra note 63, at 52–53. 
68. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 236, 239 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
executive order relocated 112,000 persons based only upon the possible 
disloyalty of a few, “misinformation, half-truths, and insinuations,” and “no 
reliable evidence”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (shifting 
a near-impossible burden of proof to the schools when it stated that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal,” though not explicitly applying 
heightened scrutiny); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (“The State 
clearly has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a short-cut 
procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech.”); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“[S]tate 
action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is 
subject to the closest scrutiny.”). 
69. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996); 
C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons 
and Presses, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 57, 85. See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The 
Warren Court and American Politics 215–20, 303–05 (2000) (detailing 
the Warren Court’s motive to shift the burden of proof to the government). 
70. Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
71. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). But see Kagan, supra note 69 (arguing against 
scrutiny-based jurisprudence and for “purposivism”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 2417 (1996) (arguing against scrutiny-based jurisprudence but 
arguing for “permissible tailoring”). 
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message it conveys,” then that regulation is content based and, there-
fore, subject to strict scrutiny.72 This test makes three main demands: 
(1) the “burden falls on the government to defend challenged legisla-
tion”; (2) the government must “demonstrate[e] that [the law] serves a 
compelling interest”; (3) the law must be “narrowly tailored” to the 
asserted interest.73 At times, strict scrutiny offers such “aggressive” 
protection for free speech and other fundamental rights that it has been 
nicknamed “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”74 
Content-neutral laws that regulate only the time, place, or manner 
(TPM) of the speech can overreach as well.75 The Court looks especially 
skeptically at TPM regulations of the “quintessential public forum,”76 
places that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public” for the purposes of expression.77 To prevent the government 
from suppressing speech “for mere convenience”78 and to avoid un-
necessary, “incidental burdens” on speech,79 the Court filters TPM regu-
lations through a four-part intermediate-scrutiny test: (1) the law must 
be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” 
(i.e., content neutral); (2) the government must have a “significant” or 
“substantial” interest; (3) the law must be “narrowly tailored” to meet 
that interest; and (4) the law must “leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication.”80  
72. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
73. Fallon, supra note 61, at 1273–74. 
74. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). 
But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 
796 (2006) (stating that “[thirty] percent of all applications of strict scrutiny 
 . . . result in the challenged law being upheld”). 
75. See Suplina, supra note 49, at 397–99 (arguing that legislators can manip-
ulate and abuse the Court’s distinction between content-neutral and content-
based laws). 
76. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (plurality). 
77. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). The public forum includes only 
places traditionally recognized as public forums, such as streets, parks, and 
sidewalks; and places designated “by government fiat” to assembly and debate. 
Perry Ed. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
78. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014). 
79. Margaret Greco, Comment, Take a Step Back: The Constitutionality of 
Stricter Funeral-Picketing Regulations After Snyder v. Phelps, 23 B.U. Pub. 
Int. L.J. 151, 159 (2014). 
80. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 797 (1989) (quoting Clark 
v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). See also 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (“[T]he Court has 
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordin-
ating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these 
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Although heightened scrutiny is often understood as and applied as 
a sort of “rigid,” mathematical formula, it is essentially a system of 
“categorical balancing” through which the Court combines the “two 
unbridgeable worlds of form and substance.”81 The Court does make 
certain “a priori” determinations when it asks, as a threshold matter, 
which level of scrutiny it will apply.82 But it does not predetermine 
results; it does not attribute set amounts of weight to the rights at 
stake; and it does not impose the exact same burden of proof in every 
case analyzed under a given level of scrutiny.83 Instead, each level of 
scrutiny acts as a floor to ensure that individual rights and interests 
receive at least a certain amount of weight and predetermines a possible 
range of weight to the individual right or interest, not a built-in, precise 
weight.84 In doing so, it “eliminate[s] the rigidity,” “promote[s] more 
 
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified 
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government . . . .”). 
81. Shaman, supra note 64, at 104–05; Gaskins, supra note 63, at 53. See Steven 
J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse, 
and the First Amendment, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 101, 108 (2012) (discussing 
balancing free speech “within a broader framework of rights”); Fallon, supra 
note 61, at 1316 (“[C]ourts need to identify the rights that trigger [heightened 
scrutiny].”). 
82. Shaman, supra note 64, at 105. But see Fallon, supra note 61, at 1293–97, 
1306–08 (explaining that the Court often “effectively applie[s] [heightened 
scrutiny] as if it were a balancing test” but that many justices oppose this 
approach and, instead, apply the test as a formula); Volokh, supra note 71, 
at 2438–39 (focusing on the fact that the Court does not explicitly discuss 
strict scrutiny in terms of balancing while “sympathiz[ing] with the normative 
theory behind this view”). 
83. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
740–41 (1996) (“[T]his Court has restated and refined these basic First 
Amendment principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance 
of competing interests and the special circumstances of each field of applic-
ation.”); Shaman, supra note 64, at 102–05; Heyman, supra note 81, at 126 
(explaining that the Snyder v. Phelps Court mistakenly relied on “abstract 
categories,” as opposed to looking at the precise interests); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 58 (1987) (arguing 
that although the Court “does not speak explicitly” in terms of balancing in 
First Amendment cases, it uses an “implicit balancing approach”). Justice 
Marshall illustrates this point in a series of Social Security and welfare-
benefit dissents, arguing that the majority’s formulaic approach ignored 
constitutional differences between and concededly equated “state regulation 
[of business or industry]” with the “literally vital interests” of “powerless 
minorit[ies] [including] poor families without breadwinners,” and “families of 
disabled persons,” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 91 (1971) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
84. See Shaman, supra note 64, at 105–09. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ., 518 
U.S. at 741 (“[T]he First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment 
to protect speech from government regulation through close judicial scrutiny, 
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accuracy,”85 and prevents judges from “overstat[ing] governmental in-
terests” to ensure protection for preferred rights.86 The requisite burden 
of proof, then, depends upon the overall, “delicate and difficult” balance 
of all of the rights, interests, and considerations at stake.87 
The “narrowly tailored” prong often acts as the balancing prong.88 
Though this prong “contains significant, unresolved ambiguities” and 
“has sparked little systematic investigation,”89 it is the “touchstone” of 
the heightened scrutiny analysis.90 At its essence, this prong ensures a 
sufficient “connection between challenged legislative means and the 
ends they are intended to promote.”91 “[E]merg[ing] from contrasts,”92 
this prong balances at least three things to determine whether a law 
has a sufficient means-end fit: (1) the amount of speech burdened by 
the law;93 (2) the availability of “alternative means of pursuing the same 
 
thereby enforcing the Constitution’s constraints, but without imposing 
judicial formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables 
government from responding to serious problems.”) (emphasis added); Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–23 (1982) (explaining that although a school’s 
policy does not cleanly fit into any heightened-scrutiny category, “more [was] 
involved” than an “abstract question” of categorization and that, at the very 
least, the “denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an 
affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause”). 
85. Shaman, supra note 64, 109. 
86. Stone, supra note 83, at 73. 
87. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
88. See Fallon, supra note 61, at 1330 (explaining that narrow tailoring depends 
on “whether the damage or wrong attending an infringement on protected 
rights is constitutionally acceptable in light of the government's compelling 
aims”). 
89. Id. at 1326; Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erikson, The Jurisprudence of 
Precision: Contrast Space and Narrow Tailoring in the First Amendment 
Doctrine, 6 Comm. L. & Pol’y 259, 277 (2001) (“[T]he jurisprudence of 
precision is anything but precise, and the Court has been quite haphazard 
in its narrow tailoring analyses.”). 
90. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see Powe, supra note 69, at 
320 (explaining that Justice Brennan, while developing this prong, often 
assumed arguendo the sufficiency of the government’s interest then looked 
skeptically at the government’s means of achieving that interest); Volokh, 
supra note 71, at 2421 (“Most cases striking down speech restrictions, 
however, rely primarily on the narrow tailoring prong . . . .”). 
91. Fallon, supra note 61, at 1274. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1327–29. 
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goals”;94 and, most importantly here, (3) the “proof of necessity of in-
fringement on a triggering right.”95 Courts must then assess these fact-
ors “in light of” the weight of the government’s interest.96 
The necessity factor involves “empirical judgments.”97 The govern-
ment can meet its burden of proof if it can show that it enacted a given 
law to protect a pressing, “extremely weighty, possibly urgent” public 
need.98 Because “the past informs the present,”99 and because the gov-
ernment has “the power to deal with coercion,”100 violence, and other 
problems that disrupt its interests,101 history can demonstrate necessity 
if the prohibited activity imminently threatens the government’s inter-
ests.102 
For content-neutral TPM cases, the government may show a lesser 
degree of urgency to pass constitutional muster because TPM laws rest-
rict less speech. To meet its burden, the government need not show 
that TPM restrictions are “the least restrictive or least intrusive 
means.”103 It must show only that a “substantial government interest” 
would be “achieved less effectively absent the regulation”104 and that 
 
94. Id. at 1330.  
95. Id. at 1274. Focusing on heightened scrutiny in all contexts, Fallon discusses 
the “overinclusiveness” and “underinclusiveness” of the law in place of the 
first factor listed here. Id. at 1327–29. In the First Amendment context, 
however, the breadth of a restriction plays into the Court’s assessment of the 
burden on free speech. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 
(1989) (“[TPM regulations may not] burden substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”). 
96. Fallon, supra note 61, at 1330 (referring to this consideration as “proportion-
ality”). See, e.g., Zachary J. Phillipps, Note, The Unavoidable Implication 
of McCullen v. Coakley: Protection Against Unwelcome Speech Is Not a 
Sufficient Justification for Restricting Speech in a Traditional Public Fora, 
47 Conn. L. Rev. 937, 944, 946 (2015) (arguing that the Court did not 
adequately address precedent requiring that the Court “must balance” the 
“unwilling listener’s right to be let alone” with “the speaker’s right to 
communicate”). 
97. Volokh, supra note 71, at 2424. 
98. Fallon, supra note 61, at 1273. 
99. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 172 (1st Cir. 2009). 
100. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 
312 U.S. 287, 299 (1941). 
101. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S 703, 725–30 (2000) (explaining that an eight-
foot floating buffer zone was narrowly tailored). 
102. See Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 297–99 (explaining that an injunction 
was narrowly tailored because of its imminent relationship to the evil the 
government sought to address). 
103. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
104. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
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the law does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary 
to further the government’s legitimate interests.”105 The government 
often meets this burden of proof through the “necessity” element by 
showing merely that the prohibited activity impedes the government’s 
interest106 and that the law serves the interest in a “direct and effective 
way.”107 In Grayned v. Rockford,108 for example, the Court upheld an 
ordinance that prohibited “the making of any noise or diversion” (man-
ner) on sidewalks near schools (place) while school is in session (time).109 
Mindful of the “nature of the place,” the Court explained that the law 
regulated “boisterous demonstrators”110 who “materially disrupt[] class-
work,” the substantial government interest, but the law allowed for 
peaceful, nondisruptive demonstrations.111 
Part III highlights that when the government can show a history of 
disruptive activities, courts more readily find that the government rest-
ricted speech out of necessity. Parts III, IV, and V further explain that 
the Court does not just assess histories specific to the precise restrict-
ions to evaluate necessity; it also considers the broader histories that 
inform the government’s decision. These Parts also illustrate that when 
confronted with histories of disruption, both general and specific, the 
government often implements buffer zones to strike the balance between 
advancing its substantial interests and protecting free speech. 
III. Buffer Zones: Implementing the Balance  
by Factoring in History 
A “buffer zone” is a type of TPM regulation that focuses on the 
“place” in which the speech occurs.112 Buffer zones specify, often by 
 
105. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 
106. See Volokh, supra note 71, at 2421–24 (“When the Court says . . . that a law 
must be ‘necessary to serve a compelling state interest,’ it seems to be 
referring to [advancement of the interest, no overinclusiveness, and least 
restrictive alternative].” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 
(1992) (plurality))). 
107. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. 
108. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
109. Id. at 108. 
110. Id. at 119. 
111. Id. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503 (1969)). 
112. See Amy E. Miller, The Collapse and Fall of Floating Buffer Zones: The 
Court Clarifies Analysis for Reviewing Speech-Restrictive Injunctions in 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 275, 290 (1998). 
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measurements, an area in which at least some manner of speech is pro-
hibited.113 Like the phrase suggests, lawmakers and courts impose buf-
fer zones to “separat[e] conflicting forces”114 as a “prophylactic”115 means  
of protecting a governmental interest or a conflicting constitutional 
right.116 While the Massachusetts buffer zone in McCullen may have 
been “truly exceptional,”117 legislatures and courts frequently use buffer 
zones to combat disruption in a variety of contexts, ranging from chur-
ches to ATMs.118 
The outcome of a challenge to a given buffer-zone turns on the 
particular circumstances surrounding the buffer zone.119 Like in other 
free speech cases, courts take a serious look at the amount of speech 
burdened by the size or breadth of the buffer zone.120 Court-imposed 
injunctions, though facially more narrowly drawn,121 “carry greater risks 
 
113. Id.  
114. Buffer Zone, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/buffer%20zone [http://perma.cc/XG8Z-NSY5] (last visited Mar. 
7, 2016). 
115. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014). 
116. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–16 (2000) (protecting public 
health, safety, and constitutional right to privacy); Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (protecting constitutional right to vote). 
117. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. 
118. See Rockford, Ill., Code of Ordinances § 19-13(21) (2013) (prohibiting 
demonstrations within 150 feet of any place of worship); Kansas City, Mo. 
Mun. Code § 50-8-5(c)(2) (2007) (prohibiting panhandling within twenty 
feet of any ATM). Additionally, the Texas State Legislature proposed a bill 
that imposed a buffer zone limiting the distance at which people can film 
police officers. MaryAnn Martinez, Texas Lawmaker Wants Filming Police 
to be Illegal, Kens 5 (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:05 PM), http://www.kens5.com/ 
story/news/2015/03/13/texas-lawmaker-wants-filming-police-to-be-illegal/ 
70317008/ [http://perma.cc/2E3B-BVL6]. Due to public backlash, the legis-
lature quickly dropped the bill. Allison Wisk, Bill to Limit Filming of Police 
Activity is Dropped, The Dallas Morning News (Sept. 28, 2015, 10:35 
PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20150410-
bill-to-limit-filming-of-police-activity-is-dropped.ece [http://perma.cc/8HC9-
QTSA]. 
119. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994); Heyman, 
supra note 81, at 169. 
120. Heyman, supra note 81, at 168–71. Often times, courts preoccupy themselves 
with the exact size of the buffer zone. See, e.g., Clift v. City of Burlington, 
925 F. Supp. 2d 614, 638 (D. Vt. 2013) (“While there is ‘no outer limit’ on 
the size of a buffer zone, the 36 and 15-foot dimension upheld in Madsen and 
Schenck serve as benchmarks for what is permissible.”) (citations omitted). 
121. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2538 (“[G]iven the equitable nature of injunctive 
relief, courts can tailor a remedy to ensure that it restricts no more speech 
than necessary.”). 
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of censorship and discriminatory application”122 and are subject to 
something in between intermediate and strict scrutiny.123 “Floating” 
buffer zones, which move to protect a given listener, are also more likely 
unconstitutional because they tend to overburden speakers.124 
But buffer zones live and die by the necessity element. A law’s 
history often reveals that the government had few other choices in order 
to advance its interest.125 The cases that follow demonstrate that the 
Court looks at two factors to assess the necessity motivating a given 
buffer zone: (1) the extent of the histories of disruption; and (2) the 
degree to which the disruption impedes upon the government’s weighty 
interest.126  
A. Labor-Protest Laws 
Buffer zones are sometimes used to regulate labor protests “because 
of the excessive violence associated with [them].”127 The Court has never 
dealt with a statutorily imposed buffer zone restricting labor protests, 
but “several states have enacted regulations on the right to picket and 
the time, place, or manner of such picketing.”128 
 
122. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764. 
123. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) 
(partly invalidating an injunction because it “burden[s] more speech than 
is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests”). 
124. See Miller, supra note 112, at 294–95 (contrasting the Court’s treatment 
of floating buffer zones with its treatment of fixed buffer zones). 
125. See, e.g., Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380–85; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772–75 (detailing 
protestors’ offensive actions as a basis for upholding parts of buffer zones). 
126. For discussion on these factors, see infra Part V. Because the necessity 
element, like heightened scrutiny as a whole, involves categorical balancing, 
the weight of the government’s interest often affects how necessary a given 
law is. See infra Part V. Captive audience cases provide an obvious example 
of this. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[In 
the home,] the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.”). The weight of the government’s interest 
is often a factor in buffer zone cases as well. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 703, 
717, 727–28 (upholding a buffer zone in part because it protects medical 
privacy). However, this is outside the scope of this Note. 
127. Rachel Entman, Note, Picket Fences: Analyzing the Court’s Treatment of 
Restrictions on Polling, Abortion, and Labor Picketers, 90 Geo. L.J. 2581, 
2588 (2002). 
128. Id. at 2591. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-1317 to -1318 (2000) (prohibiting 
“unlawful picketing” and “mass picketing,” each of which can be committed 
by just one person in a number of ways, and including engaging in “any form 
of picketing in which pickets constitute an obstacle to the free ingress and 
egress to and from the premises being picketed or any other premises” as 
an example of “mass picketing”). 
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Additionally, the Court addressed the constitutionality of court-
imposed buffer zones in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies.129 There, the Court upheld a state-court 
order permanently enjoining employees of dairy companies from all 
picketing near stores where the companies’ products were sold.130 
Importantly, the Court emphasized that the protests involved “violence 
on a considerable scale.”131 The employees smashed store windows, set-
off “explosive bombs” as well as “stench bombs,” destroyed a number 
of vendor vehicles, burned down one dairy store, and severely beat and 
threatened other nonunion employees.132 Although the government can-
not deny free-speech rights “by drawing from a trivial rough incident 
or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peace-
ful picketing has the taint of force,” the violence in this case was 
“neither episodic nor isolated.”133 The Court explained that the state 
has the power and perhaps even the duty to “protect its storekeepers” 
from violence and coercion.134 
B. Polling-Place Buffer Zones 
All states use buffer-zone statutes to protect voting booths and 
polling places.135 The Court upheld such a statute in Burson v. 
Freeman.136 There, a Tennessee statute prohibited the “display” or “dis-
tribution” of “campaign materials” and the “solicitation of votes” with-
in 100 feet of any polling place.137 The Court subjected the content-
based law to strict scrutiny and noted that “the First Amendment ‘has 
its fullest . . . application’” in cases involving campaign speech.138 But 
 
129. 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
130. Id. at 291, 299. 
131. Id. at 291. 
132. Id. at 291–92. 
133. Id. at 293, 295. 
134. Id. at 294. The Court further noted that the injunction, though it was broad 
and prevented some peaceful picketing, was specific enough. Id. at 298 (“The 
injunction is confined to conduct near stores dealing in respondent’s milk, 
and it deals with this narrow area precisely because the coercive conduct 
affected it.”). See also Trevor Burrus, Injordinances: Labor Protests, Abortion- 
Clinic Picketing, and McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 167, 
182 (2014) (explaining that the “history and possibility of violence justif[ied] 
the broad prohibition on even peaceful picketing”). 
135. Robert Brett Dunham, Note, Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day 
Restrictions on Political Speech, 77 Geo. L.J. 2137, 2143 (1989). 
136. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
137. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2–7–111(a), (b)(2) (Supp. 1991). 
138. Burson, 504 U.S. at 196 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)). 
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the Court also stated that the government “interests in preventing 
voter intimidation and election fraud” and “preserving the integrity of 
[the] election process” are especially strong because the “right to vote 
freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic 
society.”139 
The Court concluded that the buffer zone was narrowly tailored 
because “[t]he only way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit 
access to the area around the voter.”140 In other words, the restriction 
was necessary. To “reconcile” the competing interests, the Court looked 
to two main factors.141 First, the Court laid out extensive histories dur-
ing the United States colonial period, in Australia, and in some Euro-
pean countries.142 These histories “reveal[ed] a persistent battle against 
two evils: voter intimidation and election fraud.”143 Second, it explained 
that voter intimidation and election fraud likened the countries’ voting 
processes to “entering an open auction place” and had proven “difficult 
to detect,” threatening the democratic process.144 
Thus, the broad, widespread history of disruption at polling places 
showed necessity and played an integral role in the Court’s balancing 
process, along with the threat that the right to vote, a right central to 
our government, could be compromised. 
C. Political Protest and Security Measures Buffer Zones 
Not surprisingly, the government often imposes buffer zones as a 
security measure where political protests might be especially obtrus-
ive.145 Courts hold that both general and specific histories of disruption 
can justify the use of buffer zones as security measures, as long as the 
measures are “tied to identifiable risks and harms against which they 
 
139. Id. at 199, 206 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Eu v. 
S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). The Court 
separated voter fraud and the importance of the right to vote into two compell-
ing government interests. Id. at 198–99. 
140. Id. at 207–08. 
141. Id. at 198. 
142. Id. at 200–06. 
143. Id. at 206. 
144. Id. at 202, 208. 
145. Currently, Cleveland is struggling with the placement of a “free-speech 
zone” for protestors during the Republican National Convention in July 
2016. Andrew J. Tobias, Cleveland Plans ‘Free-Speech Zone’ for Republican 
National Convention, but May Struggle to Find a Location, Cleveland. 
com (August 26, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/rnc-2016/ 
index.ssf/2015/08/cleveland_plans_free-speech_zo.html [http://perma.cc/ 
3VEZ-NRD4]. 
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are designed to protect.”146 Courts have reminded that “[s]ecurity is not 
a talisman that the government may invoke to justify any burden on 
speech,” but that past experiences across the nation could justify a 
buffer zone.147 
As an extreme example of a specific history of disruption, the dis-
trict court in Menotti v. City of Seattle148 upheld an emergency order 
prohibiting access to large portions of downtown Seattle during the 
1999 World Trade Organization conference.149 There, protestors grew 
violent before the conference had even begun by vandalizing and looting 
stores, attempting to take over one store, throwing Molotov cocktails, 
and hurling rocks at police officers.150 When the conference open- 
ed, “things got worse” until the city “bordered on chaos”151 and the 
streets turned into “seeming war zones.”152 Protestors wielded weapons, 
“lock[ed] down intersections by forming human chains,” continued van-
dalizing and looting stores, assaulted police officers, and even assaulted 
conference delegates.153 As things “spiral[led] out of control,” some off-
icers began fighting fire with fire, which put the general public at risk.154 
Though the number of violent protestors was small in comparison to 
the number of peaceful protestors, the court held that the emergency 
order was necessary to protect residents of Seattle and world leaders 
against such severe violence and “clear and present risks.”155 The court 
further stated that “once multiple instances of violence erupt, with a  
146. ACLU of Colo. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. 
Colo. 2008) (citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 
477 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
147. Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004). See 
also Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Sagardia De Jesus, 
634 F.3d 3, 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding a statute prompted by “endemic 
violent crime” that allows cities to control access to their streets); Tetaz v. 
District of Columbia, 976 A. 2d 907, 915–17 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding a 
one-hundred-yard police line around the Capitol Building); Citizens for 
Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1221, 1223 (upholding a broad “security zone” 
based only on hypothetical threats). 
148. 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
149. Id. at 1117–18. 
150. Id. at 1120–21. 
151. Id. at 1121. 
152. Id. at 1123 (quoting Seattle City Council, Report of the WTO 
Accountability Review Committee 4 (2000)). 
153. Id. at 1121–23 (“Some violent protestors stopped one delegate’s car and 
punctured its tires. Reflecting the extreme dangers to delegates, protestors, 
and the public, at least one WTO delegate drew a gun in response to the 
protestors’ attempts to detain him, requiring immediate police intervention.”). 
154. Id. at 1122. 
155. Id. at 1123, 1136. 
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breakdown in social order, a city must act vigorously, and more exten-
sively.”156 
Explicitly rejecting the notion that buffer zones need to be based 
only on “specific, known threats,”157 the district court in ACLU v. City 
& County of Denver158 exemplifies that broader histories of disruption 
can justify restrictions on speech. At issue in that case was a security 
measure that prohibited “all public expressive activity by non-creden-
tialed individuals” on portions of several Denver streets during the 2008 
Democratic National Convention.159 “[W]ith little specificity,” the Sec-
ret Service based its security concerns on bombings that took place in 
New York City, Oklahoma City, and various “bomb attacks around the 
world.”160 Nevertheless, the court held that this history provided the 
buffer zone with a “sufficient fit” and showed that “closure of the streets 
[was] necessary.”161  
Likewise, the First Circuit in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of 
Boston162 upheld buffer zones surrounding the 2004 Democratic Nation-
al Convention, despite the fact that there was no “event-specific threat 
evidence.”163 The court reasoned that a “recent past experience with 
large demonstrations,” the 2000 Democratic National Convention in 
Los Angeles, met “the quantum of ‘threat’ evidence” and proved that 
the city’s “extreme” measures were narrowly tailored.164 Further, the 
Tenth Circuit in Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado 
Springs165 upheld a “security zone” across several blocks that was “com-
pletely closed to all persons” based only upon the “hypothetical,” un-
proven “threat of a terrorist attack utilizing explosives.”166 The court 
 
156. Id. at 1137. 
157. ACLU of Colo. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. 
Colo. 2008). 
158. 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Colo. 2008). 
159. Id. at 1176. 
160. Id. at 1176–77 (referring to the court’s analysis of a Secret Service member’s 
testimony). 
161. Id. at 1177, 1178. 
162. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
163. Id. at 13–14. 
164. Id. Boston imposed a “hard” buffer zone, a “highly secure” area to which only 
“specially authorized classes of persons” could gain access, and “soft” buffer 
zones, to which access was “generally unrestricted.” Id. at 10. The court 
explained that, in cases like this, “the public interest cuts both ways.” Id. at 
15. Though “[a] burden on protected speech always causes some degree of 
irreparable harm,” the “concerns voiced by the City were real.” Id. 
165.  477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007). 
166.  Id. at 1217, 1223. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
Preventing Conflict or Descending an Iron Curtain? 
870 
reasoned that the restriction was necessary to prevent delegates at a 
NATO conference from being harmed by any potential detonations.167  
In contrast, the Supreme Court has invalidated federal buffer-zone 
statutes concerning political protests in both Boos v. Barry168 and U.S. 
v. Grace169 because the government failed to show any proof of necess-
ity.170 At issue in Boos was a 500-foot statutorily imposed buffer zone 
that prohibited the display of any sign outside of foreign embassies 
“designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium 
any foreign government.”171 Although there was some evidence that for-
eign government officials had been successfully harassed, other federal 
statutes already prevented harassment.172 But the government present-
ed no proof that “more extensive measures [were] necessary,” so the 
extremely broad, content-based restriction could not withstand strict 
scrutiny.173 
The Grace Court invalidated a federal statute prohibiting any per-
son from standing or moving or displaying “any flag, banner, or device 
designed . . . to bring into public notice any party, organization, or 
movement” on the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court for lack 
of proof.174 No history suggested that these sidewalks were “in any way 
different from other public sidewalks” or that “a lone picketer” could 
frustrate the Government’s interest in maintaining “proper order and 
decorum.”175 Rather, the history revealed only that “[c]ourts are not 
subject to lobbying . . . and they do not and should not respond to 
parades, picketing, or pressure groups.”176 
D. Buffer Zones Targeting an “Evil” that Necessarily  
Impedes Governmental Interests 
The Court also upholds buffer zones by emphasizing the second 
necessity factor, the degree to which the disruption impedes upon the 
government’s weighty interest, when the prohibited conduct and the 
governmental interest fundamentally oppose one another. Here, the  
167.  Id. at 1221. The court also explained that it would “give deference to a 
reasonable judgment by the City as to the best means of providing security 
at the NATO conference.” Id.  
168. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
169. 461 U.S. 171 (1983). 
170. Boos, 485 U.S. at 327. 
171. Id. at 316 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-1315 (1938)). 
172. Id. at 324–27. 
173. Id. at 327. 
174. Grace, 461 U.S. at 172–73, 183 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (1982)). 
175. Id. at 182–83. 
176. Id. at 183. 
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focus is not on the law’s history but instead on the logical connection 
between the prohibited conduct and the government’s interest. This 
analysis comes up most often when the government’s goal is to protect 
a right to privacy.177 In these cases, the protests are often aimed at 
preventing the exercise of a privacy right.  
In Frisby v. Schultz,178 the Court upheld an ordinance that prohib-
ited any picketing “before or about” any residence.179 The majority con-
strued the statute as “a limited one” that prohibits only “focused pick-
eting taking place solely in front of a particular residence.”180 The city 
showed that protestors consistently picketed outside the home of a doc-
tor performing abortions, which held the doctor “captive” and “figurat-
ively, and perhaps literally, trapped [him] within [his] home”—actions 
that conflicted with the government’s interest in protecting the privacy 
of the home.181 Though this disruption may have had some influence on 
the case’s outcome, the Court did not explicitly rely on it. Instead, the 
Court explained that the law is constitutional because picketing at the 
home “inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy” and 
because the statute “targeted” only this “evil.”182 In some situations, 
then, the second necessity factor provides enough urgency to satisfy the 
necessity test without a showing of history. 
E. Funeral-Protest Buffer Zones 
Lawmakers and courts use both the logical-connection analysis and 
the history-of-disruption analysis to justify buffer zones in the funeral-
picketing context. At least forty-four states have imposed buffer zones 
around funeral processions.183 The buffer zones range from 100 to 1,000 
feet, and nineteen of those states settle on a 500-ft buffer zone.184 
The federal government, too, deems funeral-protest buffer zones 
necessary. In 2012, the Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for 
Camp Lejeune Families Act185 revised the Respect for America’s Fallen 
 
177.  See infra Parts III.E and III.F.  
178. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
179. Id. at 476. 
180. Id. at 483. The dissent argued that this ordinance looked like a “total ban.” 
Id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
181. Id. at 484, 487. 
182. Id. at 485. 
183. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011); Greco, supra note 79, at 155. 
184. Nathan Eilert, Comment, Counting the Cost of Free Speech: Evaluating a 
Nation’s Attempts to Protect the Honor of Its Troops, 23 Kan. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 262, 265 (2014). 
185. Pub. L. No. 112-154, tit. VI, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, 1195–99 (2012). 
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Heroes Act186 by beefing up the buffer zones surrounding funerals.187 
This Act prohibits picketing from two hours before a funeral until two 
hours after and rather stringently imposes 300- and 500-foot buffer 
zones, which increased the previous buffer zones by 150 and 200 feet.188 
“[T]he great majority” of these statutes, with Ohio’s as the only 
known exception, were motivated by the Westboro Baptist Church’s 
(WBC) extensive funeral picketing.189 Though WBC has only about 
seventy members, it is dedicated to picketing around the country to 
spread its message: God punishes the United States by killing its sol-
diers for tolerating homosexuality, an abominable sin.190 To that end, 
WBC has picketed “an estimated 51,358 events” since 1991 and garners 
national media attention as often as possible.191 Moreover, WBC has 
picketed in every state and in almost 1,000 cities.192 The picketers carry 
signs reading “God Hates Fags,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 
9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God 
for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests 
Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.”193 
 
186. Pub. L. No. 109-228, § 2, 120 Stat. 387 (2006). 
187. Press Release, Office of Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Sec’y on H.R. 
1627 (Aug. 6, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/ 
06/statement-press-secretary-hr-1627 [https://perma.cc/GD9C-2XA2]. 
188. Eilert, supra note 184, at 269. 
189. Heyman, supra note 81, at 166 & n.368. See Greco, supra note 79, at 155 
(“Seemingly as a direct result of Westboro’s activities, at least forty-four 
states and the federal government have passed laws regulating funeral 
protests.”). 
190. Greco, supra note 79, at 152–53; Eilert, supra note 184, at 264. 
191. Eilert, supra note 184, at 263–64. However, WBC’s official website states 
that it has picketed at 55,979 events. Westboro Baptist Church Picket 
Schedule, GodHatesFags.com (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.godhatesfags. 
com/schedule.html?COLLCC=952175322& [http://perma.cc/TW7U-ZJZ7]. 
192. Kendra Suesz, America versus Westboro Baptist Church: The Legal Battle to 
Preserve Peace at the Funerals of Fallen Soldiers, 27 Neb. Anthropologist 
160, 167 (2012); Westboro Baptist Church Picket Schedule, supra note 191. 
The website lists its official “numbers,” or statistics, for categories such as 
“soldiers that God has killed in Iraq and Afghanistan,” an ever-increasing 
“people whom God has cast into hell since you loaded this page,” and 
“nanoseconds of sleep that WBC members lose over your opinions and 
feeeeellllliiiiiings,” a number that remains at “0.” Id. 
193. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011); Phelps-Roper v. City of 
Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 683 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Phelps-Roper v. 
Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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Though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality 
of these buffer zones,194 the Court stated in Snyder v. Phelps195 that 
funeral-protest picketing is “not beyond the government’s regulatory 
reach” and is “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrict-
ions.”196 Furthermore, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for both the Sixth 
and the Eighth Circuits have upheld somewhat broad funeral–picketing 
buffer zones.197 In Phelps-Roper v. Strickland,198 the Sixth circuit upheld 
the constitutionality of a 300-foot Ohio buffer-zone statute prohibiting 
picketing and “other protest activities” at funeral or burial services from 
one hour before the service until one hour after the service.199 The 
Eighth Circuit upheld an identical Missouri buffer zone in Phelps-Roper 
v. City of Manchester.200 Although each court discussed the extensive 
general history of the disruption caused by the Westboro Baptist Chur-
ch, the courts focused on the logical connection between the significant 
privacy right in “the character and memory of the deceased” and pro-
tests.201 Despite the sizes of the buffer zones, the statutes were limited 
in time and targeted only protesting directed at funerals.202 Thus, the 
courts concluded that the statutes were necessary. 
As in Frisby, the second necessity factor plays a strong role in funer-
al protest cases. The government’s interest and the prohibited conduct 
inherently oppose one another. It is also likely that courts weigh rights 
to privacy heavily enough that an urgent need to protect that right 
arises from the mere possibility that the right could be impeded upon. 
F. Abortion-Clinic Buffer Zones 
Similarly, courts have emphasized both the first and the second 
necessity factors in cases involving abortion-clinic buffer zones. Unlike 
Frisby, however, lawmakers implementing abortion-clinic buffer zones 
were confronted with much more pervasive histories of disruption. Anti-
abortion protestors have wielded violence, harassment, intimidation, 
 
194. Greco, supra note 79, at 155. 
195. 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding that the Westboro Baptist Church’s picket-
ing, however “outrageous,” is constitutionally protected speech and must be 
shielded from tort liability). 
196. Id. at 456 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984)). 
197. Manchester, 697 F.3d 678; Strickland, 539 F.3d 356. 
198. 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008). 
199. Id. at 358 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3767.30 (West 2006)). 
200. 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012). 
201. Manchester, 697 F.3d at 693; Strickland, 539 F.3d at 365–66 (quoting Nat’l 
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2004)). 
202. Manchester, 697 F.3d at 693–95; Strickland, 539 F.3d at 368–69. 
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and obstruction as weapons for inspiring change ever since the Court 
decided Roe v. Wade.203 Indeed, “clinic-front activism” became an 
“identifying hallmark[]” of the antiabortion movement for the next 
several decades.204 As a result, buffer zones have played an especially 
prominent role in curbing the history of disruption outside of abortion 
clinics and protecting women seeking abortions, health-care providers, 
and abortion-clinic employees.205 
On several occasions, the lower federal courts have decided 
abortion-clinic buffer-zone cases based, at least in part, on histories of 
disruption.206 Further, the Supreme Court relied on histories of disrupt-
ion to uphold at least portions of abortion-clinic buffer zones in three 
cases. In each of these cases, the Court recognized substantial govern-
mental interests in ensuring public safety and order, preserving wo-
men’s rights to seek lawful medical counseling, and protecting medical 
privacy.207 
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc.,208 protestors congregated 
around a Florida abortion clinic in numbers varying “from a handful to 
400.”209 They obstructed access to the clinic, distributed literature, sang 
and chanted, sometimes used loudspeakers or bullhorns, and even har-
assed doctors and clinic employees at their homes.210 Initially, the trial 
 
203. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Dallas A. Blanchard & Terry J. Prewitt, 
Religious Violence and Abortion: The Gideon Project 36–40 (1993) 
(analyzing the sociological and anthropological backdrop of the violent anti-
abortion movement). 
204.  Joshua C. Wilson, The Street Politics of Abortion: Speech, 
Violence, and America’s Culture Wars 1–2 (2013). 
205. Allison Lange, Note, First Amendment – Freedom of Speech and the Press – 
Statute Regulating Speech and Speech-Related Conduct Within 100-Feet of 
an Entrance to a Health Care Facility is a Narrowly Tailored Content-Neutral 
Time, Place, and Manner Regulation – Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 
(2000), 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 429, 430 (2001). 
206.  See, e.g., Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(upholding an ordinance’s fifteen-foot buffer zone because it “promises to 
accomplish the City’s objectives” but striking down its one-hundred-foot 
buffer zone because the ordinance lacked “support, either in the record or 
in case law”); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F. 3d 
184, 204–205 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a sixty-foot buffer zone is “un-
necessary” because “the evidence indicates that clinic access . . . is pre-
served by application of the [previous] buffer zones”). 
207. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–17 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 
Inc., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 
753, 767–68 (1994). 
208. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
209. Id. at 758. 
210. Id. at 758–59. These protests frustrated the government’s interests because 
they increased health risks in patients. Id. 
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court issued a non-speech-related injunction with no buffer zones. But 
when that order proved ineffective, the trial court imposed a much 
broader, multifaceted injunction.211 
The Court upheld two parts of this injunction, using the history-
of-disruption analysis for the first and the logical-connection analysis 
for the second. First, the Court held that a thirty-six-foot buffer zone 
prohibiting protesting and congregating in front of clinic entrances and 
places of ingress and egress “burden[ed] no more speech than necess-
ary.”212 Though the buffer zone looked like a total ban and applied at 
all times, history revealed that the protestors obstructed access to the 
clinic and that the “state court seem[ed] to have had few other op-
tions.”213 Second, the Court upheld a provision prohibiting noise “within 
earshot” of the clinic during a specific set of hours.214 After noting the 
importance of noise control around medical facilities, the Court explain-
ed, again, that the trial court did what was necessary to protect the 
government’s interests.215 
But history could not show that the injunction’s most broad pro-
visions satisfied either factor of the necessity element. The Court struck 
down a thirty-six-foot buffer zone on the clinic’s sides and on private 
property near the clinic because “nothing in the record” indicated that 
protestors obstructed access to the clinic or even protested in these 
areas.216 Further, the Court held that a provision prohibiting any “im-
ages observable” from the clinic was unconstitutional because it ignored 
obvious alternatives—the clinic could simply “pull its curtains.”217 
Then, the Court struck down a prohibition on “all uninvited approaches 
of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful 
the contact may be,” within 300 feet of the clinic.218 Lastly, a fourth 
provision that prohibited “picketing, demonstrating, or using sound am-
plification equipment” in a 300-foot buffer zone around the residences 
of clinic employees was ruled unconstitutional because more limited 
intrusions on speech “could have accomplished the desired result.”219 
 
211. Id. at 769–70. 
212. Id. at 770. 
213. Id. at 769. 
214. Id. at 772. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 771. 
217. Id. at 773. 
218. Id. at 774. 
219. Id. at 774–75. 
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Similarly, the Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network220 relied al-
most entirely upon “extraordinary”221 histories of disruption to uphold 
provisions of a court-imposed buffer zone, but it struck down more ex-
tensive restraints on speech because the government could prove neither 
historical nor logical necessity. There, protestors at several abortion 
clinics in Upstate New York engaged in “large-scale blockades,” “consis-
tently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations,” often grabbed 
and pushed clinic patients and employees, and sometimes harassed law-
enforcement officers.222 After the protestors ignored a temporary rest-
raining order,223 the trial court issued a more stringent preliminary in-
junction with three main components: (1) a fifteen-foot floating buffer 
zone; (2) a fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone around clinic and parking lot 
entrances; and (3) a requirement that sidewalk counselors retreat from 
the fixed buffer zone once a person “indicates a desire not to be counsel-
ed.”224 
The Court struck down the floating buffer zone but upheld the 
latter two restrictions.225 It asserted that “a record of abusive conduct 
makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public side-
walk permissible.”226 Thus, the Court upheld the fifteen-foot fixed buffer 
zone because “the record show[ed] that protestors purposefully or effect-
ively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic 
doorways, from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from 
driving in and out of clinic parking lots.”227 The Court countered the 
argument that the fixed buffer zone was a “ban on peaceful, nonobstruc-
tive demonstrations” by explaining that “the District Court was en-
titled” to rely on the history of disruptive demonstrations to ban all 
demonstrations.228 While the district court did not first issue a “non-
 
220. 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
221. Id. at 383. 
222. Id. at 362–65. 
223. The trial court temporarily restrained harassment, blockades, and “‘demon-
strating within [fifteen] feet of any person’ entering or leaving the clinics” 
but allowed sidewalk counselors to engage in “conversation[s] of a nonthreat-
ening nature.” Id. at 364. The Court noted that the protestors “[a]t first, 
. . . complied with” the order but eventually continued demonstrating and 
harassing clinic patients and employees. Id. at 361. 
224. Id. at 371. 
225. Id. at 377, 380, 383–85. The floating buffer zone was deemed unconstitutional 
because it “burden[ed] more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant 
governmental interests.” Id. at 377.  
226. Id. at 377. 
227. Id. at 380. 
228. Id. at 381–82 
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speech-restrictive” injunction, as in Madsen, the Court stated the pre-
vious injunction was merely a “consideration” in Madsen and was not 
at all dispositive.229 Further, the requirement that sidewalk counselors 
retreat from that zone was constitutional because the history indicated 
that they, too, often harassed clinic patients and employees.230 
The Court confronted another floating buffer zone in Hill v. Colorado231 
but upheld the law because it “reflect[ed] an acceptable balance” be-
tween the “right to persuade” and the “right to be let alone.”232 At issue 
in Hill was a Colorado statute that made it unlawful to “knowingly app-
roach” within eight feet of another person without that person’s con-
sent.233 The Court’s narrow tailoring analysis turned on the “modest[y]” 
of the restriction, the weight of the states’ right, and the need for legisl-
ative action.234 The Court explained, firstly, that although the statute 
prevented peaceful leafletting; it did not limit the number of speakers, 
the noise level, the use of signs at a distance, or the speakers’ ability to 
approach those who consent.235  
Next, the Court indicated that state legislatures have the power to 
protect the “unique concerns that surround health care facilities.”236 Not 
unlike Frisby v. Schultz, the Court reasoned that the protestors who 
fall within the buffer zone can impair patients’ access to health care.237  
The “modest restriction,” then, really only regulates speech that pre-
vents the state from protecting patients.238  
 
229. Id. at 382–83. 
230. Id. at 384–85. 
231. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). For a discussion on Hill’s “complicated procedural 
history,” see Wainwright, supra note 57, at 257–58. 
232. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714, 716–17. 
233. Id. at 703 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–9–122(3) (1999)). The buffer zone 
in Hill differed from the buffer zone in Schenck in two important ways: (1) 
the “scienter requirement” alleviated the uncertainty inherent in floating 
buffer zones and, in doing so, reduced the burden on the speaker; (2) the 
legislature enacted the buffer zone through statute, as opposed to the court-
ordered injunctions in Madsen and Schenck. Id. at 732–33; Wainwright, supra 
note 57, at 259. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
floating buffer zone in Hill burdened far less speech than the floating buffer 
zone in Schenck. 
234. Hill, 520 U.S. at 727–30. 
235. Id. at 726–27. The Court explained that the buffer zone’s limitations could 
encourage more effective political discourse by discouraging “aggressive and 
vociferous protest[ing].” Id. at 727. 
236. Id. at 728. 
237.  Id. at 729.  
238.  Id. at 729–30. 
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Regarding the statute’s history, the Court deferred to the legis-
lature because it imposed a restriction “where the restriction [was] most 
needed.”239 The Colorado legislature based its determinations on testi-
mony “regarding abortion opponents’ conduct at abortion clinics,”240 
and on the outbreaks of violence at abortion clinics across the nation, 
including 1994 shootings at Massachusetts clinics.241 Citing testimony 
from several witnesses, the Supreme Court of Colorado explained that 
the testimony revealed incidents of obstruction, intimidation, and har-
assment.242 The Court did not discuss this history in much detail, but 
it noted that the demonstrations “impeded access,” that they “were 
often confrontational,” and that “confrontations may adversely affect a 
patient’s medical care.”243 
G. In Summary 
In each of these buffer-zone cases, courts essentially asked one ques-
tion upon which all other questions hinged: did the government need to 
act in the way that it did? To answer this question, the Court looked 
to the history of disruption and the potential harm to the governmental 
interest. The legislatures in Burson, Hill, some of the political protest 
cases, and the funeral-protest cases each considered problems on a nat-
ional level, as a whole. The legislatures allowed broader histories of 
disruption to inform their judgment, and they used those histories to 
craft their buffer zones. Additionally, none of the cases considered above 
preclude the possibility that a more general history could inform the 
necessity inquiry.  
The Court bucked this trend in McCullen v. Coakley.244 Massachu-
setts had long been a battleground state in which antiabortion groups 
such as Problem Pregnancy, Inc. and Operation Rescue targeted abor-
tion clinics, patients, and employees.245 The struggles in Massachusetts 
were, and in many ways still are, merely a part of a larger, nationwide 
effort to disrupt access to a constitutionally protected right.246 Yet, the 
Court scoffed at this history by suggesting that only histories specific  
239. Id. at 730. 
240. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 1999) (en banc). 
241. David G. Pettinari, Hill v. Colorado – The United States Supreme Court 
Squares Off with Colorado Over the First Amendment Rights of Abortion 
Protestors, 77 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 803, 803 (2000). For discussion on 
the 1994 shooting at Massachusetts abortion clinics, see infra Part IV.A. 
242. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1250. 
243. Hill, 530 U.S. at 709–10 (emphasis added). 
244.  134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
245.  See supra notes 6–19 and accompanying text. 
246.  See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text; supra notes 204–246 and 
accompanying text. 
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to the persons, places, and conduct regulated may inform a lawmaker’s 
judgment.247 Part IV explains why limiting the necessity inquiry in this 
way is problematic. Part V argues that the necessity element of height-
ened scrutiny ought to be broken down into flexible factors that allow 
legislatures and courts to adjust to a variety of circumstances. It then 
proposes that these factors reflect the two factors that guided the judg-
ment in each of the cases discussed above: the extent of the history of 
disruption and the degree to which disruption impairs the government’s 
objective.     
IV. Why “Generality vs. Specificity”  
Does Not Quite Cut It 
The Supreme Court recently reduced the necessity inquiry to one 
consideration: general history versus specific history. The Court stated 
that the legislature’s interest was limited to “one place at one time” 
and suggested that the legislature must “focus[] on the precise individ-
uals and the precise conduct causing a particular problem” when  
it regulates speech.248 But this formulation “refus[es] to take . . .  
seriously”249 the broader problems confronting many legislatures. Neith-
er prior buffer-zone cases nor the purpose of heightened scrutiny supp-
orts such a confining understanding of necessity. Contrarily, each dem-
onstrates that courts must consider a variety of things in order to accur-
ately weigh histories of disruption.   
A. The Court Contradicts Precedential Emphasis  
on Histories of Disruption 
At first glance, the Court’s formulation might appear to follow pre-
cedent. The Court has explained that free speech “cannot be denied by 
drawing from a trivial rough incident” or from “dissociated acts of past 
violence,” that acts of violence should not be “episodic” or “isolated,” 
and that a “legislature may deal with specific circumstances menacing 
the peace” and with “concrete situation[s].”250 Further, almost all of the 
Supreme Court’s buffer-zone cases involved injunctions, which typically 
address only specific conduct, precise places, and particular persons.251  
 
247.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
248. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538–39 (emphasis added). 
249. Phillipps, supra note 96, at 962. 
250. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 
312 U.S. 287, 293, 295–97 (1941). 
251. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539–40. See Schenck v. Pro-choice Network, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) 
(upholding injunctions against protestors around abortion clinics). 
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However, a more broad history is not inherently “dissociated,” 
“trivial,” “isolated,” or abstract.252 And nothing in any of the previous 
buffer-zone cases forecloses the possibility that a general history can at 
least inform a legislature’s decision to restrict speech.  
 Quite the opposite. The Court has explained that “the momentum 
of fear generated by past violence” may still call lawmakers to action.253 
Indeed, the Court held in Burson v. Freeman254 that a general history 
of disruption can show a sufficiently urgent need on its own. It explicitly 
stated that its analysis was based upon “the history of election regu-
lation in this country,” the fraud and intimidation that occurred 
“[d]uring the colonial period,” and the problems faced and solutions 
posed by other states and “other countries.”255 None of the targeted 
“evils”256 actually occurred in Tennessee, whose buffer-zone statute was 
at issue. And the Court did not discuss whether Tennessee had actually 
tried any of the possible solutions. Contrarily, each part of the Burson 
Court’s analysis relied only upon harms that occurred in other places, 
at other times, and, presumably, to other persons. 
The Court distinguishes McCullen from Burson by explaining that 
“voter intimidation and election fraud are . . . difficult to detect,” 
whereas obstruction and harassment at abortion clinics “are anything 
but subtle.”257 Similar to the analysis in Frisby v. Schultz,258 the 
McCullen Court reasoned that the prohibited conduct in Burson, camp-
aigning at polling places, and the government’s interests, preventing 
voter fraud and intimidation, were inherently opposed to one another. 
As in Frisby, then, the Burson buffer zone “targeted” only the “evil” it 
sought to prevent.259 
The Court’s reasoning misses the point. While the Burson Court 
did say that “the link between ballot secrecy and some restricted zone 
surrounding the voting area is . . . common sense,” it provided this 
“link” by observing the “ample evidence that political candidates have 
used campaign workers to commit voter intimidation or electoral 
fraud.”260 Thus, Burson’s first premise was that there is a general but 
 
252. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 293, 295–96. 
253. Id. at 294. 
254. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
255. Id. at 200, 202, 206 (emphasis added). 
256. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1988). 
257. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 
(1992)). 
258. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
259. Id. at 485–86. 
260. Burson, 504 U.S. at 207. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
Preventing Conflict or Descending an Iron Curtain? 
881 
extensive history of “a persistent battle against two evils.”261 And the 
Burson Court’s “common sense”262 link does not exist without this his-
tory. The Court “fanciful[ly]”263 eluded this point in McCullen and, in 
doing so, ignored the possibility that another history like Burson’s could 
exist. 
Further, the Court has suggested that a general history can play at 
least some role in the Court’s balance on several occasions. The statute 
upheld in Hill was motivated, in part, by the 1994 Massachusetts 
abortion-clinic shootings264—history that is not at all focused on the 
specific conduct, precise place, or particular persons restricted. Though 
the Court did not discuss this broader history, it quickly referred to the 
transcript of the statute’s legislative hearings.265 It explained that “there 
was . . . evidence” of obstruction, “confrontation[],” “abusive langu-
age,” and “that emotional confrontations may adversely affect a pat-
ient’s medical care.”266 The Hill Court’s willingness to accept that the 
legislature acted where it “most needed” to act267 implies that a general 
history combined with a more specific history can satisfy the necessity 
inquiry. 
The Court also explained in Snyder v. Phelps268 that states may 
regulate picketing at funeral speeches.269 The Court even acknowledged 
that forty-four states, along with the federal government, already have 
funeral-picketing buffer zones in place.270 Forty-three of those states 
base their restrictions on WBC’s picketing, as does the federal govern-
ment.271 While WBC has picketed at a tremendous number of funerals 
across the country,272 the small church does not present a constant, 
 
261. Id. at 206. 
262. Id. at 207. 
263. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541, 2545 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority “fanciful[ly]” defended the Act by wrongfully and “unnecessarily” 
deciding the content-neutrality issue). 
264. Pettinari, supra note 241, at 803. 
265. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 709–10 (2000). 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 730. 
268. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
269. Id. at 456–57. The Court also qualified this statement by saying that the 
funeral-picketing buffer zones are “‘subject to reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions’ that are consistent with the standards announced in 
this Court’s precedents.” Id. at 456 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
270. Id. at 456. 
271. See supra Part III.E. 
272. See Westboro Baptist Church Picket Schedule, supra note 191. 
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“imminent” threat in every city or even every state. Moreover, WBC 
has hardly made a dent in the total number of United States cities.273 
The Court’s formulation in McCullen—that the legislature must tailor 
its restrictions to precise places—would require the Court to strike 
down many of the funeral-picketing buffer zones for lack of specificity. 
In doing so, the Court would frustrate legislative efforts to protect pri-
vacy rights that people hold dear and to deal with broader problems 
through comprehensive legislation. 
B. The Specificity Requirement Undercuts the Necessity Inquiry 
The Court’s formulation misses the forest for the tree. The necessity 
inquiry is part of a larger framework that categorically balances the 
government’s interests alongside the individual’s right to free speech. 
This framework, heightened scrutiny, filters out restrictions that over-
burden speech and that, thereby, dilute public discourse or stifle indivi-
dual autonomy. But because this freedom can conflict with other rights, 
heightened scrutiny also allows the government to pursue its sufficiently 
important interests.274 Courts can adequately balance these two things 
only when they weigh the entirety of each interest, as opposed to giving 
either interest a rigid, a priori value.275 As an important part of height-
ened scrutiny, the necessity inquiry requires “empirical judgments” 
based on all of the relevant factors.276 Therefore, courts must ask wheth-
er any relevant aspect of a history of disruption could have contributed 
to the urgency of the government’s interest. But the Court prevented 
itself from doing so in McCullen. By imposing a specificity requirement, 
the Court slashed the necessity inquiry down to a single consideration. 
It is true that, in some sense, the Court’s specificity requirement 
serves a purpose of heightened scrutiny because it ensures greater pro-
tection for free speech and prevents unnecessary government intru-
sion.277 It is also true that the Court must prevent the government from 
“overstating its purpose” to infringe upon those rights. Further, it is 
true that some support the conclusion that “buffer zones need to be 
tailored to fix specific . . . problems.”278  
 
273. There are almost 20,000 cities in the United States. 2002 Census of 
Governments, United States Census Bureau (May 21, 2015), https:// 
www.census.gov/govs/www/02PubUsedoc_GovOrg.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4BWH-YAYX]. 
274. Shaman, supra note 64, at 102–105. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying 
text. 
275. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
276. Volokh, supra note 71, at 2424. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 
151, 160-61 (1939); supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
278. Burrus, supra note 134, at 194 (emphasis added). 
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But heightened scrutiny does not automatically give the win to free 
speech when rights conflict with one another. Instead, it acts as a mech-
anism through which courts can decide which interest should prevail. 
It requires a full and honest assessment of the rights and interests at 
stake in order to arrive at the best conclusion. Moreover, legislatures 
ought to be able to minimize the negative effects of a problem that 
occurs nationwide before that problem becomes widespread in their 
states. To serve these purposes, the necessity inquiry ought to be flexib-
le enough to embrace a variety of problems, circumstances, and conflict-
ing rights, while also remaining stringent enough to protect free speech.  
V. Assessing Necessity by Weighing Histories  
of Disruption 
This Part proposes that courts take a flexible, factor-based app-
roach to remain consistent with the goals of heightened scrutiny and 
necessity. A law is narrowly tailored when “the means chosen are not 
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s inter-
est.”279 Because necessity can override substantial burdens on speech—
a fundamental right and a cornerstone of democracy—the government 
satisfies the necessity inquiry only when it can demonstrate a sufficient 
level of urgency, which varies according to the level of scrutiny app-
lied.280 The government can meet these requisite levels of urgency by 
focusing on the factors that subtly guide the Court’s analysis in other 
buffer-zone cases: (1) the extent of the law’s history; and (2) the degree 
to which that history impedes on the government’s interest. 
A. The Extent of the Law’s History 
Courts analyze this factor in a variety of ways. They look to the 
disruption’s (a) pervasiveness, (b) its egregiousness, (c) its timing, and 
(d) its specificity. To do so, they must approach buffer-zone cases in a 
flexible, balanced manner that is consistent with heightened scrutiny. 
The cases discussed in Part III do not suggest that any particular com-
bination of these things represents either a sufficient or a necessary 
condition. They suggest only that “the past informs the present”281 and 
that courts weigh all relevant aspect of the problems that confront leg-
islatures to achieve the most accurate, just result. 
First, courts look to the disruption’s pervasiveness, or how often 
the disruption occurs. If the disruption occurs repeatedly, then lawmak-
ers likely have fewer options. But if the disruption is more isolated, then  
279. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). 
280. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor 
Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941) (“[A]n injunction [on picketing] must be read 
in the context of its circumstances.”). 
281.  McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 172 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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the buffer zone appears less necessary. In both Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network, Inc.282 and Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc.,283 the 
obstruction and harassment was continuous284 And in Madsen, the 
disruption even persisted after the initial injunction failed.285 But even 
if the disruption does not repeatedly occur in the restricted location, a 
court might still determine that the disruption is sufficiently pervasive 
if it occurs in a multitude of other locations over a long period of time. 
In Burson v. Freeman,286 for example, the government did not show 
that voter intimidation or election fraud had ever taken place in Tenn-
essee. But these problems had occurred during the United States colo-
nial period, in “other Western democracies,” and in Australia.287 
Second, courts look to the egregiousness of the disruptive activity. 
In Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor 
Dairies, Inc.,288 a series of assaults, destruction of property, and bomb-
ings made it difficult for the trial court to disentangle labor picketing 
from violence.289 The Court stated that “the momentum of fear generat-
ed by past violence would survive even though future picketing might 
be wholly peaceful.”290 And in Menotti v. City of Seattle,291 Seattle’s 
mayor imposed an emergency-order buffer zone when the city was faced 
with “chaos” and borderline-riots.292 Acts of violence, then, are given an 
especially large amount of weight and can justify a buffer zone that is 
not pervasive, timely, or specific. A threat of violence, too, can be suff-
iciently egregious. The security concerns in ACLU v. City & County of 
Denver293 were based on a few, unrelated bombings that occurred in 
different parts of the country.294 But because of the devastation such a 
bombing could cause, the government showed that the history of dis-
ruption was sufficiently egregious. Moreover, serious harms to import-
ant rights could satisfy the necessity inquiry. The Court in Burson was 
 
282. 519 U.S. 357, 362 (1997). 
283. 512 U.S. 753, 758–59 (1994). 
284. Schenck, 519 at 362; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758–59. 
285. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. 
286. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
287. Id. at 206. 
288. 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941). 
289. Id. at 294. 
290. Id. 
291. 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
292. Id. at 1121. 
293. 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Colo. 2008). 
294. Id. at 1176–77. 
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willing to defer to legislatures where the right to vote and the integrity 
of the voting process were added to the scales.295 
Third, the timing of the disruption can help to show that legislative 
action is especially necessary. In Menotti, Seattle needed to act as quick-
ly as it could because the World Trade Organization conference was 
taking place as the disruption was occurring.296 Every moment wasted 
was a moment that could have resulted in further harm to people or 
property. 
Fourth, although the Court in McCullen overstates the role that 
specificity should play in evaluating history, histories specific to the 
conduct, places, or persons restricted help to demonstrate that the law 
is burdening no more than it needs to in order to accomplish its goal. 
The Court confronted such specific histories in at least three cases. In 
each case, the buffer zone was imposed by an injunction, which almost 
always “afford[s] more precise relief.”297 In both Schenck and Madsen, 
the Court upheld buffer zone injunctions because the government dem-
onstrated that the obstruction and harassment took place at only the 
exact places in which speech was restricted, at the Upstate New York 
and Florida clinics near the clinics’ doorways, parking lot entrances, 
and driveways.298 Further, the buffer zone in Madsen was limited only 
to the defendants who had caused the disruption, Operation Rescue 
and its members.299 Similarly, the Court in Milk Wagon Drivers upheld 
a buffer zone that applied only to the persons committing the violent 
acts (dairy company employees) and to the places at which the violent 
acts were committed (stores at which the companies’ products were 
sold).300 Circuit courts, too, are more likely to uphold a buffer-zone law 
when its restrictions are tightly tied to its history. In Menotti, the Court 
upheld an injunction prohibiting access to only the portions of the city 
at which violence and disruption had taken place.301 Although none of 
these cases involve buffer zones that were specific in every respect, the 
greater a buffer zone’s specificity, the more necessary it appears. 
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In United States v. Grace302 and Boos v. Barry,303 the government 
failed to show that any of these factors were present.304 It is not exactly 
clear what combination of these factors satisfies the necessity inquiry. 
But the cases do demonstrate that lawmakers give themselves a lot of 
room to prevail if they can plausibly show one or more of the factors. 
B. The Degree to Which the Disruption Impedes upon  
a Right or Interest 
If the government can show that, as a matter of logic, the restricted 
activity impedes upon the government’s interest, then it can much more 
easily show that its buffer zone is necessary to serve that interest. Here, 
the protestors’ goals often involve eroding privacy rights or preventing 
people from effectuating a given right. In Hill, for example, the protest-
ors who fell within the buffer zone typically wanted to prevent clinic 
patients from seeking medical care at the clinic.305 Without the buffer 
zone, then, protestors can more readily infringe upon clinic patients’ 
right to be left alone and prevent them from accessing medical care at 
the clinic.     
The greater the impediment, the less extensive the government’s 
history has to be.  In Frisby v. Schultz,306 the Court indicated that 
someone cannot enjoy the privacy of his home so long as protestors 
engage in the targeted residential picketing that home.307 There, the 
restricted activity wholly prevented the government from advancing its 
interest. Although the government could show some history of disrupt-
ion, that history made little difference to the Court’s analysis. If the 
government can show that it cannot advance its interests without the 
buffer zone, then its history of disruption can be purely hypothetical.  
The Court has upheld buffer zones based on a combination of the 
two necessity factors. In Hill, the Court relied on history of harassment 
outside of the abortion clinics that was general and not-so-pervasive 
because that harassment made it more likely that the government could 
not protect the “unique concerns that surround health care facilities.”308 
Similarly, the courts in Phelps-Roper v. Strickland309 and Phelps-Roper 
v. City of Manchester310 relied on a combination of an extensive history  
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and a direct conflict between funeral protests and the right to privacy 
at funerals.311  
Though the particulars of the necessity inquiry have yet to be teas-
ed out, the Court has long used this element of heightened scrutiny to 
flexibly consider these two factors and to reconcile free speech with 
other governmental interests. Thus, the Court should embrace these 
factors, reject McCullen’s rigid reasoning, and allow histories of disrupt-
ion to play a more consistent role. 
Conclusion 
Disagreement often sets truth-finding in motion. It can push people 
to confront their points of view and to either challenge themselves or 
strengthen their own arguments. For many, this principle lies at the 
core of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. By closing that 
discussion off, the government may do irreparable damage to societal 
progress that could have been or to individual moments that are forever 
lost. Perhaps, then, the physical separation that buffer zones impose 
muffle truth-finding and bind self-determination. Perhaps, this physical 
separation acts as an “Iron Curtain” behind which those who fear opp-
osing ideas and differing viewpoints cower. 
But violence, harassment, and physical obstruction rarely add much 
to the polis; and those who employ these tools of disruption likely are 
not interested in truth. Furthermore, society must protect and preserve 
a variety of interests and rights, even when those rights conflict with 
free speech. By hamstringing the government from restricting speech in 
these situations, courts could give way to irreparable damage and could 
prevent other rights from ever being fully realized. A factor-based app-
roach to the necessity inquiry gives both lawmakers and courts the 
flexibility they need to weigh all relevant factors and best reconcile all 
competing interests. Lawmakers cannot divide the market-place of ideas 
with an iron curtain, but they should not be powerless to address broad-
er problems.  
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